I wish to return to a critique that I briefly proposed in the first short paper assignment, so I suppose I am simultaneously using this email to inquire if a more developed explanation on that critique would be alright by you as well:
The problem I had with the 'meaning-intention to meaning-intuition' topic was the idea that I believed there to exist an expressionless-formless layer of meaning to lie deeper than the stratum of conscious intentionality. We discussed in class how passive synthesis, the hyletics were always re-arranging and re-settling in a way that was constantly under the surface and perpetually informing the noetic acts of trans.consciousness. So I am grappling with how to formulate what it is I am thinking and how it meshes with what Husserl says. This idea of the passive synthesis interests me a lot and seems to speak to the idea that I wish to elaborate upon further in discussing acts of meaning that arise prior to expressive acts of consciousness. Meditation four seems crucial in undertaking this task-the idea of 'active grasping' seems to be where I might disagree with Husserl-for it seems that he believes 'reason' to bare far too much significance in the possession of meaning-I wish to articulate the idea that cogitatum (controversial term in this context?) need not need be 'actively' grasped via reason in order to bare meaning. I might only be saying then, that the passive synthesis are constantly informing us in the nexus that is our constitutive synthesis. My critique might amount to simply asserting then that attempts to explicate embodied formless meanings via eidetic reduction-which explicates into only the essential parts so to render them rationally understandable, oversimplifies the richness of activity that constitutes a meaningful experience in existence. I believe this oversimplification to lie in Husserl's need to aquire universalizable results-in longing for that which is essential, he oversimplifies the richness of meaningful experience.
Another direction I might go with an interest in hyletics would be to provide a more intensive exploration upon the conception of habitual apperceptions affecting us and motivating our activities as a result of the passive synthesis' response to various 'objects'. The idea of a 'developed' ego encountering apperceived objects we've become aquainted with seemingly calls for a more developed explanation. So, here I would want to play out what it means to have our conscious acts motivated by habituated passive synthesis, or in other words; the way our emotions and our passions have grown accustomed to activating upon the presence of kinds of apperceptions and how this internal passional activation determines our choices of action. Our Egos develop and thicken and become aquainted with apperceptions. Our emotions inform the Ego. It seems that if our passive synthesis are motivating us in this sense-that they can have a sort of embodied memory capacity-which means that the way we respond to almost all situations in life would be determined to some degree by the events surrounding apperceptions which led to the thickening process to occur in a particular way. Various events would have left their mark on the strata of sub-conscious passivity-this arises two questions: Does Husserl give passions and conditioned emotions an accurate portrayol in our constitutive synthesis? And, what would it mean if our bodies had a limited capacity for thickening with regard to ways our emotions respond to apperceptions. As I think of this it obviously strikes me that this is the kind of story that psycho-analytics tells which may be disuading from embarking upon it.
Well I've said a lot here; as you can see I'm sort of stuck with a pile of possible ideas-I've written a bit in each direction now but could use a little feedback as to what you think of either of these approaches (whether or not there's any point in pursuing them further and if so... any tips?)